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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

RICHARD JAIME YANEZ,

CaseNo.20010087-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal isfroma judgment and conviction of discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000); purchase/possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10503 (Supp. 2000); and tampering with a witness, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8508 (Supp. 2000), all third degree felonies (R. 135-36) (in Add. A). This Court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did defendant commit the offense of tampering with a witness by
threatening a witness notwithstanding no official investigation or criminal
proceeding was yet under way?
"The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case is a
question of law we review for correctness." State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, f4,
988 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1999); see also State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah
1991); State v. Allen. 2000 UT App. 340, K 7, 15 P.3d 110; State v. Nones. 2000 UT App.
211, f 5, 11 P.3d 709. Further, resolution of this issue requires interpretation of a statute,
which presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Spainhower. 1999 UT
App 280, f4; see also State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1991); State v. Dickey.
841 P.2d 1203,1204-05 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
2. A. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that before it could
convict defendant of witness tampering it did not have to find that an actual
investigation or official proceeding was under way, only that defendant subjectively
believed as much?
As defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, does not argue manifest
error, and did not submit his own instruction below, the Court should not review this
issue, and no standard of review applies.

2
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B. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he did not
object to the jury instruction concerning the existence of an investigation or official
proceeding on the basis that it was an inaccurate statement of this element of the
crime?
An issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on appeal, is resolved as
a matter of law. State v. Silva, 2000 UT App. 292, f 12, 13 P.3d 604; State v. Gallegos,
967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998).
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of
demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, 687-88,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984)). Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland. 2000 UT 76, f 19
(citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687-88); Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f22.
3. A. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance when he did not move
to dismiss the charges of possession of a firearm and discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle for insufficient evidence?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as that provided for Issue 2B,
supra.

3
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B. Did the trial court properly determine that there was sufficient evidence to
support the witness tampering conviction?
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, defendant must "'marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.5" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 25
(quoting State v. Rudolph. 2000 UT App. 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192) (additional quotations
omitted); see also State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998). Evidence is sufficient
if "'the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that]
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App.
13, f 26,17 P.3d 1153 (quoting State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App. 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949,
cert, denied. 4 p.3d 1289 (Utah 2000)) (additional quotations omitted).
4. Did the trial court properly rule that the witness tampering charge did not
merge with the charge of discharging a firearm from a vehicle?
"Whether two or more crimes merge, thereby precluding separate convictions, is
then 'essentially an issue of statutory construction that we review for correctness,
according no particular deference to the trial court.'" State v. Lopez. 2001 UT App. 123,
H 9, 24 P.3d 993 (quoting State v. Pierson. 2000 UT App. 274, f 8, 12 P.3d 103
(additional quotation omitted)).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 2000);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with three third degree felonies: discharge
of a firearm from a vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000);
tampering with a witness, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2) (Supp. 2000);
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (Supp. 2000) (R. 2-4, 65-67).l Following a one-day trial, a jury
convicted him as charged (R. 68-70, 72-74, 107-09; 183:214). Defendant moved to arrest
judgment as to the tampering charge, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
establish defendant's subjective belief that an investigation or official proceeding was
under way at the time charged in the information (R. 110-18; 183:223-24). The court
denied defendant's motion and sentenced defendant to the state prison for three-to-five
years for count one, and zero-to-five years each for counts two and three, to be served
concurrently (R. 137-38; 183:231,235). Defendant timely appealed (R. 158-59, 169-70).

l

The parties stipulated at trial that defendant was adjudicated delinquent as a
juvenile in 1997 for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult
(R. 183:162).
5
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Near 9:30 a.m on the morning of May 9, 2000, Robert Maestas was driving to
work when he noticed defendant crouching down by a bridge near 500 South 1100 West
in Salt Lake City (R. 108:83-84, 86).2

Defendant appeared to be looking around as if

waiting for something or looking to see who was watching (R. 183:83). A gold Honda
automobile was idling, empty, next to the bridge (R. 183:84). Thinking defendant might
require help of some sort, Maestas turned around and returned to the bridge, at which
point he saw that defendant was spraying graffiti on the side of the bridge (R. 183:84-85).
As Maestas neared the bridge, defendant ran to his car (R. 183:86). Maestas passed
without stopping and noticed behind him that defendant's car had pulled away going the
opposite direction, turned around, and begun to follow him (R. 183:87).
Believing he was being followed, Maestas drove home and parked his truck in an
alley by his neighbor's house where it could not be seen from the street and waited fifteen
minutes without incident (R. 183:87-89). He then left for work again, driving a different
route than he normally used for fear of running into defendant (R. 183:88-89). As he
reached the intersection of 800 West and 850 South, he again saw defendant's gold
Honda, this time parked at an abandoned house (R. 183:90-92). As he passed the house,

2

Because this appeal involves a question concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence, the State presents the facts in some detail. On appeal, this Court reviews the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 422-23 (Utah App.), cert
denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
6
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he saw defendant emerge from the bushes with a small caliber handgun in his left hand
(R. 183:92, 102). Defendant dropped the bag he was holding, pointed at Maestas with
one finger of his right hand as Maestas passed him, then got into his car and followed
Maestas (R. 183:93-94,114).
Maestas turned a comer and looked behind him for defendant, who had followed
him through the turn (R. 183:93-94). Maestas decided defendant was "coming after" him
and decided he would stop at a nearby senior citizen's center to call the police (R. 183:9495). However, as he drew close to the senior citizen's center, defendant had drawn to
within two car lengths of him and was traveling at "a very high" rate of speed (R.
183:95). Fearing for the safety of the people at the senior citizen's center, and worried
that defendant might try to ram his truck from behind, Maestas decided against stopping
to call the police (R. 183:96,109).
Looking in his mirror, Maestas noticed defendant put his left arm out the driver's
window holding the handgun and point the gun toward Maestas' truck (R. 183:96-97).
Maestas was approaching a stop sign when he heard the unmistakable "pop" of gunfire
and crouched down on the bench seat of his truck to avoid being hit (R. 183:97-99).
Looking in his "blind-spot mirror" located just above his regular rear view mirror,
Maestas saw the gun in defendant's hand recoil twice, although he did not hear any more
audible shots (R. 183:97-99). As the truck stopped, Maestas threw it into reverse,
anticipating that defendant would try to ram the truck and hoping that, with his own truck
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in reverse, the impact would disable defendant's Honda and knock defendant out (R.
183:99-100). However, defendant turned his car around instead and went back the way
he had come (R. 183:100). Maestas took a moment while stopped to scribble down
defendant's license plate number, guessing at the last letter (R. 183:104).
Maestas drove straight home, yelling to his neighbor as he arrived to call the police
(R. 183:102-03). Fearing defendant would return, Maestas himself ran inside and called
the police to report the morning's events (R. 183:103). After giving his statement to the
police and describing defendant, Maestas chose defendant's photo from a ten-photo
spread (R. 183:103,112, 114-16). At trial, Maestas was absolutely sure about his
identification of defendant and the fact that defendant had held a gun and fired it at him
(R. 183:115).
A significant part of Maestas' testimony was corroborated at trial by Matthew
Shell, who was riding his bike from his friend's house near the abandoned house at 800
West and 850 South between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. on May 9, 2000 (R. 183:118-19). As
he left his friend's house, Shell saw defendant's gold Honda parked at the abandoned
house, noting that fact because there are generally no cars parked there and none had been
there scant minutes before when he had arrived (R. 183:119-20). He noticed defendant
come from the vicinity of the house holding what "looked like a small caliber [silver]
handgun" in his left hand (R. 183:121). Shell then saw Maestas drive by in his truck,
having known him most of his life and being familiar with his truck (R. 183:104-05, 121-

8
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22, 129). Shell saw defendant point with his right hand as Maestas drove by, then saw
him get into his car and follow Maestas down the street (R. 183:121-22). Shell continued
halfway down the block before hearing two pops that "sounded like gunshots" coming
from "around the corner" in the direction Maestas and defendant had driven (R. 183:12324). He then heard tires screech twice, sounding like a car had stopped quickly, turned
and taken off (R. 183:124). He was positive in his identification of the sounds he heard
(R. 183:124-26).
Officer Robin Howell visited the abandoned house and found graffiti from two
gangs written by two individuals (R. 183:138-39). One moniker on the house was
"Sleepy," which is the moniker defendant uses in connection with his membership in the
Avenues 43rd Street Gang (R. 183:141). The officer presented Maestas with a ten-picture
photo spread, and Maestas identified defendant's picture as the person he had seen by the
bridge and at the abandoned house (R. 183:141-43). The officer also checked out the
license number Maestas had given him, finding that it matched the plate on defendant's
gold Honda, except for two letters (R. 183:143-44).
When Officer Howell confronted defendant, defendant admitted to doing the
graffiti on both the bridge and the abandoned house and admitted seeing Maestas' truck
pass him twice at the bridge (R. 183:146-47). He denied having a gun at the abandoned
house, however, claiming instead to have been holding a can of spray paint in his hand
(R. 183:147). When he saw the same truck pass, he claimed he flashed a derogatory

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gesture with his hand (R. 183:148). He then got in his car and drove home, which
required that he go the same direction as the truck for a couple of blocks before turning
(R. 183:148). Defendant denied ever possessing a gun (R. 183:148).
Officer Howell testified that the police take graffiti complaints seriously, as graffiti
has the potential to "start gang wars/' and individuals who create graffiti can sometimes
be identified by the graffiti and prosecuted or included on the police database (R.
183:151-52). He did not find any shell casings or weapon during his investigation, noting
that they could have been almost anywhere by the time he conducted his searches, three
days after the events (R. 183:155-59). He also noted that police received no calls from
local residents concerning shots being fired, but explained that in that area, people not
directly involved in a shooting report shots only fifty percent of the time (R. 183:158-60).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: A proper review of the entirety of the witness tampering statute defeats
defendant's claim that subsection (2)(c) requires that an official investigation or
proceeding be under way at the time the tampering occurs in order to establish a violation
of this subsection of the statute. The statute evinces a legislative intent to include all
forms of witness tampering within the scope of the statute. Defendant's interpretation
would permit an individual to threaten an eyewitness with impunity so long as the witness
has not yet reported the criminal conduct to the authorities. To permit this type of witness
tampering to escape prosecution under this subsection of the statute when witness
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tampering at the same point in time under subsection (1) is criminalized would contradict
the purpose behind the statute.
Point II: This Court should not reach defendant's challenge to the jury instruction
involving the existence of an official proceeding or investigation inasmuch as defendant
failed to object to the instruction below, offered none of his own, and does not argue
manifest error on appeal.
Further, defendant fails to establish ineffective assistance by his trial counsel based
on counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction. The instruction was a proper
statement of the State's burden under section 76-8-508(2)(c), and counsel cannot be
ineffective for failing to make a futile objection.
Point III: This Court should not reach defendant's arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced below to support his convictions of possession of a
firearm by a restricted person and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, because he failed
to preserve the issues for appellate review and does not argue either plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Neither should this Court find any ineffectiveness in defense
counsel's failure to preserve the issue as to these two convictions where the evidence was,
in fact, sufficient to support the jury's verdicts.
Additionally, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom was sufficient to
support defendant's conviction for witness tampering where it established that defendant
knew the victim, had seen him commit at least one criminal act, gestured at the victim
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while holding a handgun, twice followed the victim in his car, and did so in a manner
reasonably causing the victim to fear for his physical safety, all within the span of a few
minutes.
Point IV: Because witness tampering may be established by numerous variations
of facts, the determination of whether the conviction for witness tampering merged with
the conviction for discharging a firearm from a vehicle depends on a review of the
evidence established at trial. That evidence, together with the jury instructions, establish
that both convictions were based on independent facts and were separately proven at trial,
negating any greater-lesser relationship between the two offenses and defeating
defendant's merger claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WITNESS TAMPERING STATUTE EVINCES NO
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO EXCEPT FROM ITS SCOPE
THREATS OF BODILY INJURY MADE TO EYEWITNESSES
BEFORE THEY ARE ABLE TO APPRAISE AUTHORITIES OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting his argument that a person
cannot be guilty of witness tampering under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c) unless an
official investigation or proceeding was under way at the time the threat of bodily injury
was made. Br. of Aplt. at 12-16. He contends that the "plain and unambiguous"
language of the statutory subsection "implies" that an official investigation or proceeding

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

must first have been instituted against the suspect at the time of the threat, because you
cannot be a witness or an informant absent such proceedings. kL at 13-14.3 However, a
proper review of the statute as a whole does not support defendant's interpretation of
subsection (2)(c).
Defendant presented his position to the trial court in a motion to dismiss the
witness tampering charge, and the trial court rejected it (R. 112-18; 183:210-13). The
trial court held that the legislative intent behind the statute is clear from reading the
statute as a whole and that such a reading requires only that the person making the threat
have a subjective belief that an official investigation or proceeding is pending or is about
to be instituted at the time (R. 183:212) (ruling in Add. B).
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law to be reviewed for correctness on appeal.
See State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, f 15, 4 P.3d 795; State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357
(Utah 1993); State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). The role of an appellate
court is not to determine which of several meanings may be technically correct, but to
interpret the words of the statute "in accord with their usual and accepted meaning."

3

While defendant expressly says that the proceeding must have been instituted
"against the suspect," he provides no argument as to why the statute cannot be used
against a person who tampers with a witness or informant in official proceedings focused
on a third person. In fact, the statute's broad language provides for such a prosecution.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(b). Accordingly, the State does not address this point.
See State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that "Utah courts
routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments."); see also State v.
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground
that defendant's brief was without legal analysis or authority to support the argument).
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State v. Christensen. 2001 UT 14,fflf3, 5, 20 P.3d 329 (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)). To that end, the appellate court need look
only at the plain language of the statute to give effect to legislative intent where the
language is clear and unambiguous. State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998);
State v. Harlev. 1999 UT App 197, f 10, 982 P.2d 1145 (it is well settled that '"when
faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the
statute.m), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). Accordingly, an appellate court
presumes that the legislature used each tenn of a statute advisedly. See State v. Chanev,
1999 UT App 309, f 22, 989 P.2d 1091.
However, where there is any ambiguity to be found in a section, this Court may
define legislative intent by construing the section at issue in connection with the
remainder of the statute. See State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230, 234-35 (Utah App. 1998)
("When interpreting a statute all parts must be construed together without according
undue importance to a single or isolated portion.") (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992)), rev'd on other gnds.
1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986. See also Bott v. Deland. 922 P.2d 732, 742 (Utah 1996)
("When interpreting an ambiguous term [in a statute], we look to the legislative history
and the purpose of the statute as a whole to give effect to legislative intent.").
This Court has long recognized that the primary goal in interpreting statutes is:
to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidence by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.... We need to look
beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity.... In analyzing
14
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a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the
provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of
its terms
However, if we find a provision that causes doubt or
uncertainty in its application, we must analyze the act in its entirety and
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose....
Burns. 2000 UT 56, f 25 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Lvon v.
Burton, 2000 UT 55, f 17 & n.5, 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing the duty of an appellate court to
"avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute, or related
statutes, meaningless").
A review of the entire statute in question supports the trial court's determination
on this point. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 2000) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he
has been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by
another as a witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration
of his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of
any act performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity
as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation.
(Emphasis added.) Add. A.
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Looking at the statute as a whole, it is apparent that the Legislature intended to cast
a broad net with the language it used. The language deals with hampering an
investigation or official proceeding at any stage: before it begins, while it is ongoing, or
after it is completed. It encompasses activity which prevents reliable information from
reaching authorities, prevents authorities from using or establishing in official
proceedings the information they already have, or retaliates for information authorities
use. It is directed at those who act criminally and may become, are, or have been the
subject of an investigation or proceeding; those who know of the criminal conduct and act
to prevent the truth from reaching the authorities or act to retaliate against a witness for
having helped the authorities in their investigation or prosecution; and those who solicit
someone or are successfully solicited to hinder the passage of reliable information to the
authorities. Nothing in the statute purports to except from its scope any particular tamperrelated conduct at any stage after the criminal conduct occurs.
Moreover, subsection (1) expressly defines the scope of the time frame within
which all tampering efforts, exclusive of retaliatory efforts, violate the statute: when the
actor acts with the subjective belief that "an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted[.]" State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985);
see also State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah
1989). It is unreasonable to ascribe to the Legislature, as defendant attempts to do under
subsection (2), the intent to permit a person to use, with impunity, at that same point in
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time what may be the most persuasive or successful means of tampering with a witness:
the threat of bodily injury. To adopt defendant's reading of the statute—to require that an
official investigation or proceeding actually be under way at the time a threat of bodily
injury is made, regardless of the actor's subjective belief—would be to reward those who
know that a report to the authorities is likely to be imminent and who act quickly to make
one of the most serious threats that can be made. Nothing in the statute or in defendant's
brief provides a reasonable explanation for exclusion of pre-investigatory tampering in
the form of threats of bodily harm. See State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108,1f 12, 992 P.2d 986
(the appellate court will interpret statute to avoid absurd results).
The statute as a whole tends to encompass the entire spectrum—from the doing of
the act to be investigated to the completion of the legal process involving conviction and
sentencing for that act. Having painted the statute with such a broad brush, the legislature
is not likely to have intended defendant's narrow and restrictive reading of subsection (2).
Further, that reading does not comport with the legislative intent reasonably evinced on
the face of the statute as a whole. The trial court's inclusion of the actor's subjective
belief into subsection (2) is reasonable and is in keeping with the overall intent behind the
statute. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss did not
amount to error, and defendant's claim should be rejected.4

4

Defendant ends this point by arguing that the trial court's "erroneous"
interpretation of subsection 2(c) deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right
to be appraised of the charges against him because it permitted the State to obtain a
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POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER DEFICIENT
PERFORMANCE BY NOT OBJECTING TO A WITNESS
TAMPERING INSTRUCTION PROPERLY DEFINING THE
STATE'S BURDEN OF PROVING DEFENDANT'S SUBJECTIVE
INTENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury concerning an
element of the witness tampering offense, thereby warranting reversal of his conviction.
Br. of Aplt. at 16-19. Specifically, he claims that, pursuant to his argument in Point I,
supra, the State was required to prove as an element of the witness tampering charge that
an official proceeding or investigation was under way at the time he pursued the victim.
Id. at 12-18. However, in keeping with its ruling contrary to that position, the trial court
instructed the jury that the charged offense "does not require the State to prove that an
'official proceeding or investigation5 was underway, but only that defendant subjectively

conviction without having to prove one of the requisite elements of the crime: that an
official proceeding or investigation was under way at the time of defendant's charged
conduct. Br. of Aplt. at 15-16. Because there was no error in the trial court's
interpretation of the witness tampering statute (see text in Point I, supra), the State does
not respond to this argument. Moreover, the claim was not raised below, and defendant
fails to argue either plain error or manifest injustice on appeal. Bryant. 965 P.2d at 54647; see also State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). Further, while
defendant includes a string citation to establish that he has a right to be appraised of the
charges, he provides no authority to support his argument and makes no attempt to fit this
case into any analytical framework relating to his constitutional claim. Accordingly, this
Court should not reach the merits of this claim. See State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549
(Utah App. 1998) ("Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed
arguments."); State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address
argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority
to support his argument").
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believed that an 'official proceeding or investigation' was underway" (R. 89; jury inst.
11) (in Add. C). Defendant claims that the instruction constitutes reversible legal error
because it does not accurately reflect the requisite elements of the statute. Br. of Aplt. at
18. He also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
instruction. Id. at 20-22. However, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of his
claim, as it was not preserved below. Further, defendant fails to establish his alternative
related claim of ineffective assistance.
A.

This Claim is not Preserved
Defendant acknowledges that his counsel did not object to the challenged

instruction below. Br. of Aplt. at 3-4. As no objection was registered, the claim can be
reviewed only to avoid manifest injustice. See State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App. 30, ^ 22,
975 P.2d 469. Defendant does not claim to have suffered any manifest injustice, but
instead claims that the issue warrants review on its merits "because (1) Appellant is
represented by new counsel, and (2) the record is adequate for review." Br. of Aplt. at 4.
He goes on to argue the merits of his claim first, without mention of manifest injustice.
Id at 16-19. He then addresses himself to a related ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 20-22.
The mere fact that defendant is represented by new counsel and presents an
"adequate" record on appeal does not permit him to argue the merits of just any issue not
properly preserved for appellate review. It merely permits him to present for the first time
on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
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76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (disposing of the threshold requirement of an adequate record); State
v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 40-41 (Utah 1996). As defendant has failed to argue manifest
error and proposed no alternative instruction of his own below (R. 43-55), this Court
should not reach the merits of his claim. See State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah
1987); see also State v. Swan. 279 Mont. 483, 928 P.2d 933, 935 (Mont 1996) ("This
Court will not predicate error upon the failure to give an instruction when the party
alleging the error failed to offer the instruction.") (citation omitted).
B.

Defendant Fails to Establish the Related Claim of Ineffective Assistance
Defendant attempts to avoid the consequences of his failure to challenge the jury

instruction by including in his appellate argument a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Br. of Aplt. at 20-22. He claims that he did not receive effective assistance of
counsel because his counsel did not object to the giving of a jury instruction on the
witness tampering charge which required that the jury find that defendant subjectively
believed that an official proceeding or investigation was underway at the time he pursued
the victim in this matter. Id.
The issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on atppeal, is reviewed
as a matter of law. State v. Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, If 12, 13 P.3d 604; State v.
Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998).
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of
demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
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standard of reasonable professional judgment." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19 (citing
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)); Silva,
2000 UT App. 292, f 22. Appellate courts indulge a strong presumption that trial
counsel's conduct under the circumstances might be considered sound trial strategy,
requiring defendant to demonstrate that "counsel's actions were not conscious trial
strategy" and that "there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's
actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations omitted); see
also Litherland. 2000 UT 76,fflf17, 19. This Court will not second-guess counsel's
performance on appeal, no matter how flawed his strategic choices may appear in
hindsight. See State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591-92 (Utah App. 1995), rev'd on other
gnds, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951; State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993).
Proof of ineffectiveness cannot be "a speculative matter," but must be a "demonstrable
reality." See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Fernandez
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998).
Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88); Silva, 2000 UT App. 292, f 22. To show the
requisite prejudice, defendant must "'proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
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would have been different.'" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, % 22 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes.
871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994)) (additional quotations
omitted). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Saunders. 893 P.2d at 591; State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah
App. 1993). Where a defendant fails to establish one prong of the two-prong test, this
Court need look no further and may reject the claim. See State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d
153, 157(Utah 1989); Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 22; State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195,
1199 (Utah App.) (for each of two claims of ineffectiveness, the court refuses to reach
one prong of the test where defendant fails to establish the other prong), cert, denied. 929
P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah App. 1991) (as in "most
cases," the court disposes of the ineffectiveness claim based on defendant's failure to
demonstrate the requisite prejudice).
In this case, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness fails because defense counsel
cannot render ineffective assistance for failing to make futile objections. See State v.
Simmons. 2000 UT App. 190, % 7, 5 P.3d 1228; see also Chacon. 962 P.2d at 51. As
established in Point I, supra, section 76-8-508 does not require that the State establish the
actual existence of an official proceeding or investigation at the time the tampering
occurs. Instead, the statute is directed, in relevant part, toward tampering done at a time
when the actor subjectively believes that an official proceeding or investigation "is
pending or about to be instituted." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508; see alio Point I,
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supra. Consequently, defense counsel's failure to object to the challenged instruction as
an improper statement of the elements of witness tampering cannot constitute ineffective
assistance.5
POINT III
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL SUFFICIENCY
CLAIMS RELATING TO TWO OF HIS CONVICTIONS AND HAS
NOT ARGUED PLAIN ERROR, PERMITTING SUMMARY
REJECTION OF HIS ARGUMENTS; HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE THESE
ARGUMENTS WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THESE TWO CONVICTIONS; FINALLY, THE
EVIDENCE WAS ALSO SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S THIRD CONVICTION, WITNESS TAMPERING
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his
convictions. Br. of Aplt. at 22-37. He contends that all three convictions fail for the
absence of any "compelling evidence" that he owned orfireda gun at the victim. IdL at
26-31. As to the witness tampering charge, he argues further that the evidence did not
establish either that the victim was a witness or informant in an on-going investigation or
official proceeding or that defendant himself believed that such a proceeding was pending

Defendant includes a footnote argument that this Court should ignore United
States Supreme Court precedent permitting harmless error review of an erroneous
elements instruction and instead apply the state constitution to hold that this alleged
erroneous elements instruction should mandate reversal as a matter of law. Br. of Aplt. at
19-20 n.3. However, as the challenged instruction was an accurate statement of the
State's burden under section 76-8-508, this Court need not address this argument.
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or about to be instituted. Id at 35-36. However, this Court should reject all of
defendant's claims.
A.

Defendant Failed to Preserve a Sufficiency Challenge for the Charges of
Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person and Discharge of a Firearm
from a Vehicle
Defendant must challenge at trial the sufficiency of the evidence "by proper

motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 16,
10 P.3d 346. Defendant failed to do so in this case with respect to the charges of
possession of a firearm by a restricted person and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle.
Br. of Aplt. at 3. Neither does he argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances
on appeal. See Holgate. 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 15. Accordingly, this Court should not reach
the merits of his insufficiency claims as to these two charges. See Bryant 965 P.2d at
546-47; see also Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
B.

Defense Counsel was Not Ineffective for Failing to Challenge the Sufficiency
of the Evidence Because the Evidence was in fact Sufficient to Support the
Jury's Verdicts
To escape the consequences of his inaction below, defendant contends that his

counsel was ineffective because he failed to preserve a sufficiency challenge to two
charges despite being charged with knowledge that the preservation was necessary to
pursue the issues on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 23. Specifically, he complains that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that he either owned or fired a gun at the victim,
thereby preventing his conviction of possession of a firearm by a restricted person and
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discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. Id. at 31. To establish his claim, defendant must
meet the heavy burden outlined in Point 2B, supra.
However, contrary to defendant's argument, there was sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could find that defendant possessed and fired a handgun. So long as there
was sufficient evidence, defense counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as the challenge would have been futile. See
Simmons. 2000 UT App. 190, f 7; see also Chacon. 962 P.2d at 51 (counsel's failure to
make a futile objection does not establish ineffectiveness); State v. BueL 700 P.2d 701,
703 (Utah 1985) (effective representation does not require that counsel object when doing
so would be futile).
To prevail on appeal, defendant must "'marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.'" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 25 (quoting State v. Rudolph,
2000 UT App. 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192) (additional quotations omitted); see also State v.
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998). Evidence is sufficient if'"the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App. 13, f 26, 17 P.3d 1153 (quoting
State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App. 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949) (additional quotations omitted).
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The charge of possession of afirearmby a restricted person requires that the State
establish, among other things, that defendant "purchasefd], transfer[ed], possessefd],
use[d], or ha[d] under his custody or control" a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)
(Supp. 2000). Add. A. Discharge of a firearm from a vehicle requires proof that
defendant in fact discharged a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a). Add. A. The
State adduced evidence below from two people that defendant held a gun in his left hand
at the abandoned house and that he later fired that gun from a car. Both Maestas and
Shell testified that they saw a small caliber handgun in defendant's left hand when they
saw him near the abandoned house (R. 183:92,102, 121). Maestas further testified than
in the ensuing chase, defendant put his left arm out the driver's side window of his Honda
while holding the gun, heard the unmistakable sound of a single gunshot, then, while
crouched on the bench seat of his truck, looked in the convex rearview mirror and saw
defendant's hand recoil twice more (R. 183:96-99).
Shell thereafter testified that after seeing defendant holding the gun, he continued
down the block on his bike while defendant left the area in his car (R. 183:121-24).
Shortly thereafter, Shell heard the unmistakable sound of at least two gunshots coming
from the direction Maestas had testified the shooting occurred (R. 183:93-94, 123-26).
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably determine that defendant not only
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possessed, but used the firearm, rendering the evidence sufficient to support the
convictions on both charges.6
Defendant claims that this evidence is too "speculative," "improbable," and
"unreliable," and points to the absence of any "compelling evidence" that he held or fired
a gun. Br. of Aplt. at 28, 31-34. However, when the evidence presented at trial conflicts
or is disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 240
(Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). This
Court will not substitute its own judgment on witness credibility for that of the jury, and
will not weigh conflicting evidence. See State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 22 (Utah App.
1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Further, the mere existence of
conflicting evidence or inferences does not warrant reversal. Id.
Defense counsel made the same basic argument to the jury below regarding the
absence of the "compelling evidence" defendant notes on appeal-no gun, no shell
casings, no bullet holes, and no reports of shots being fired (R. 183:193-95). The jury
was aware that Maestas and Shell had known each other a long time and that, while they
had time to discuss the relevant events between their occurrence and the trial, they had

6

Shell provided other testimony corroborative of Maestas' testimony, including:
the location of defendant at the abandoned house and the timing of his appearance, the
gestures defendant made while at the abandoned house, the timing of squeeling tires that
he heard shortly thereafter, and the description of defendant (R. 183:90-94, 97-100, 102,
112, 114-15, 118-19, 121-22, 124-26, 129).
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mentioned it to each other only on the day the events occurred and on the day of trial (R.
183:128-29). The jury also knew about the fear Maestas felt at the time and was
specifically instructed about the need to consider the various elements which could affect
eyewitness testimony (R. 94-97, jury inst 16) (in Add. D).7
The evidence on this element was a matter of witness credibility, which the jury
decided against defendant after his counsel's express argument and after careful
consideration of all the relevant factors pursuant to proper jury instructions. Defendant's
argument on appeal presents no persuasive reason to believe that his trial counsel
reasonably should have expected that a motion or objection relating to the sufficiency of
this evidence would be successful. Neither has he established that the trial judge likely
would have decided the credibility issue amy differently. Because the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, defendant has not established that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to make a futile motion or objection, and this claim fails.
C.

The Evidence was Sufficient to Support Defendant's Conviction for Witness
Tampering
As with the other two convictions, defendant complains that there was no

"compelling evidence" that he owned a gun or fired one at the victim. Br. of Aplt. at 2631. Once again, so long as the jury credited the testimony of Maestas and Shell, there was
sufficient evidence to support their determination that defendant had a gun in his

'Pursuant to State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 494-95 & n.8 (Utah 1986).
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possession and fired it at least once during the altercation at issue. See subsection IIIB,
supra.
Defendant also complains that there was no evidence that Maestas was a witness
or an informant in an official proceeding or investigation under way at the time of the
altercation, preventing a conviction for witness tampering under section 76-8-508(2)(c).
Br. of Aplt. at 35-36. However, pursuant to the argument in Point I, supra, the statute
does not require that the State establish the actual existence of an official proceeding or
investigation at the time of the tampering in order to convict a defendant under subsection
(2)(c). Accordingly, defendant's claim is without merit.
Finally, defendant argues that even if the trial court properly held that the State
need only establish defendant's subjective belief that an official proceeding or
investigation was pending or about to be instituted, the evidence was insufficient to
establish such a belief on defendant's part. Br. of Aplt. at 36. However, as the trial court
held, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom amply support the jury's
determination that defendant in fact held such a belief (R. 183:231) (in Add. D).
Defendant, a known gang member, admitted that he had been painting graffiti on
the bridge and the abandoned house when Maestas came upon each scene (R. 183:141,
146-48). That conduct amounts to a class B misdemeanor in this case (R. 183:153). Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-107 (1999). The parties stipulated that at the time, defendant was a
"restricted" person, inasmuch as he had been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile in 1997
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for an offense which would have been a felony if done by an adult (R. 183:161-62). The
jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant knew that his conduct was
unlawful. The first time he saw Maestas pass the bridge, pull an immediate U-turn and
pass again, defendant responded by immediately getting into his own car, turning it
around, and following Maestas (R. 183:84-87). Defendant's conduct was such that
Maestas feared for his safety, lost defendant, and parked his car out of sight of the street
for fifteen minutes then began to take a different path to work so as to avoid defendant
(R. 183:87-89).
The second time defendant noticed Maestas drive by, he registered his recognition
of him by pointing at him with one hand in a gesture Maestas took to be a threat (R.
183:93-94, 114, 121-22). At this point, defendant knows that the same person is now able
to place him at two different locations where the graffiti was done. He is also aware that
it has only been minutes since he last saw Maestas at the bridge. A reasonable inference
from this situation is that defendant recognizes that Maestas had time to report the
sighting by the bridge during the intervening minutes. Even if the jury did not draw this
inference, it is reasonable for the jury to determine that, as of the time defendant saw
Maestas for the second time, he is fully aware that Maestas can identify him just as easily
as he identified Maestas and that there is a good chance that an eyewitness who may not
have reported a single sighting may well report to authorities seeing the same illegal
conduct committed by the same person twice in one morning. Defendant's conduct
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thereafter—chasing and actually shooting at Maestas and causing Maestas to fear for his
personal safety—strongly suggests that defendant believed that Maestas was likely to
report both incidences and knew that Maestas, as an eyewitness, was likely to play a key
part against him in an upcoming investigation.
The fact that defendant's escalating conduct toward Maestas would subject him to
felony prosecution suggests that defendant seriously believed his suspicions that Maestas
either had or would report his sightings of defendant to the authorities and that defendant
was intent on preventing him from doing so.
The arguments defendant sets forth on appeal were presented by his counsel to the
jury in his closing remarks below and were rejected by the jury in rendering verdicts of
guilty as charged. The jury clearly believed the evidence and witnesses defendant
attempts to discredit on appeal, and that evidence established both that defendant
possessed and fired a gun at Maestas and that he subjectively believed an investigation
was pending or about to be instituted. Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's
claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support his witness tampering conviction.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO MERGE THE WITNESS TAMPERING AND
DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM CHARGES BECAUSE THE
CHARGES DO NOT REQUIRE IDENTICAL ELEMENTS, AND
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
SEPARATE CHARGE AND CONVICTION FOR EACH CRIME
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to merge the
charge of discharging a firearm with the charge of witness tampering (R. 183:169-72) (in
Add. E). Br. of Aplt. at 37-42. He argues that the charge of discharging a firearm is
necessarily proved by the same or less than all the facts necessary to establish the charge
of witness tampering. Id. at 40-42. He also argues that, under the facts of this case, the
jury could not find that he was guilty of witness tampering without necessarily finding the
requisite elements for discharge of a firearm. Id. at 37,40-42. Both these arguments fail
under the circumstances of this case.
An offense is an included offense when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-l-401(3)(a) (1999) (emphasis added). Generally, a comparison of the
statutory elements of the offenses at issue will suffice to determine whether a greaterlesser relationship exists between the statutes. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. However, where
the offenses have multiple variations, this Court will also look beyond the statutory
elements and "'consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship
exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial.1" Id, at 241
(quoting State v. HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)).
Discharge of a firearm may be committed in a variety of ways:
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm:
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle;

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the
actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances ..., in which
case it is a third degree felony
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons,
knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered;
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a
firearm in the direction of any vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508. Add. A. The jury was instructed on these variations (R.
87, jury ins. 9) (in Add. E).
Witness tampering may also be committed in a variety of ways. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-508. Add. A. In this case, the jury was instructed that they could convict
defendant if they found, beyond a reasonable doubt, in relevant part, that he had
communicated to Maestas a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to
do bodily injury while harboring the subjective belief "that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted" (R. 88-89, jury ins. 10-11) (in Add. E
and C, respectively).
A comparison of the statutes as they apply to this case establishes that the elements
of witness tampering do not necessarily include the elements of discharge of a firearm.
Witness tampering requires that defendant act while harboring a subjective belief that an
official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted. Discharge of a
firearm requires no such intent. This point was made clear to the jury through the written
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instructions (R. 87-89, jury ins. 9-11) and the prosecutor's closing argument (R. 183:20307). Additionally, the jury was instructed that
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information.
Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The
fact that you may find the accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses
charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.
(R. 86, jury ins. 8). The record shows no objection by defendant below to this instruction,
and he argues no manifest error in the instruction on appeal.
Not only was the jury properly instructed as to the additional element required for
witness tampering and the need to base the convictions on different evidence, but the
evidence readily permits the jury to made the requisite findings to support both
convictions. The jury could reasonably have determined that Maestas felt threatened by
defendant long before the gun was discharged. He was sufficiently threatened by
defendant's following him the first time that he parked out of sight for fifteen minutes,
despite being late to work (R. 183:87-89). He was thereafter sufficiently intimidated by
defendant, the presence of a gun, and defendant's gesturing at him at the abandoned
house to look in his rear view mirror after passing the house to see whether he was being
followed (R. 183:93-95). It was at that point that Maestas determined that defendant was
"coming after him," prompting Maestas to make mental plans to stop at a senior center to
call the police (R. 183:93-95). The evidence is clear that defendant's actions and conduct
imparted to Maestas a reasonable fear of bodily injury, without the need to consider
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defendant's later act of actually discharging the gun in Maestas' direction. The latter act
independently supports the conviction for discharge of a firearm from a vehicle.
Because the jury was properly instructed as to the need for the additional element
for the witness tampering conviction and the need to base each conviction on separate
evidence, and because the evidence provides ample opportunity to the jury to comply with
its legal responsibilities, the two charges did not maintain a greater-lesser relationship,
and defendant's claim fails. See State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611,619 (Utah App. 1998); see
also State v. Casev. 2001 UT App. 205,123,424 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; State v. Lopez.
2001 UT App. 123, f 13, 24 P.3d 993.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jb

day of September, 2001.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
FALSIFICATION IN OFFICIAL MATTERS

2000 Supplement

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B
1999 EDITION
Placs in Pockst of Corresponding Bound Volume.

76-8-508* Tampering with witness — Retaliation against
witness or informant — Bribery — Communicating a threat.
( D A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has
been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by
another as a witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of
his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act
performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or
informant in an official proceeding or investigation.
History: C. 1963, 76-8-608, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 198,1 76-8-608; 1988, ch. 176,1 1;
9000, ch. 1, i 116.
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Amendment Note*. — The 2000 amend
ment. effective May 1, 2000, added "or" in
Subsection (1Kb).

and ownership of dangerous weapons by certain
persons.
For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section
76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section
62A 7-101; or
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent
felony as defined in Section 76 3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony
offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony
offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the
United States.
!) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses,
las under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third
degree felony.
3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses,
:s, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same

76-10-608. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a
highway, or in direction of any person, building,
or vehicle — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or
firearm:
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle;
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway;
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state;
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or
distribution;
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal;
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic
sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous
weapon from the owner or person in charge of the property within 600
feet of:
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed,
including a barn, poultry yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard.
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the
person being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in
charge of the property at the time in question.
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor
unless the actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances
not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which
case it is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to
an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison:
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or
persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be
endangered;
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent
to damage a habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2),
discharges a firearm in the direction of any building; or
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a
firearm in the direction of any vehicle.
(3) This section does not apply to a person:
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful
defense of self or others; or
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20 1 5
and 76-10-523 and as otherwise provided by law.

[\e.

,5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in
other section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under
is custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section
ntrol.

History: € . 1963, 76-10-508, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-606; 1990, ch. 328, ft 3;
1992, ch. 99, ft I; 1995, ch. 23, ft 2; 1999, ch.
295, ft 1; 2000, ch. 214, ft 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective March 14, 2000, added the
clause beginning "and the convicted person" to
the end of the introductory paragraph in Sub-

listory: C. 1953, 76-10-503, enacted by L. section, effective May 1, 2000.
X>, ch. 303, ft 5.
Laws 2000, ch. 90 attempted to amend this
lepeals a n d Reenactnients. — Laws section, but the repeal and reenactment by ch.
>0, ch 303, § 5 repeals former § 76-10-503, 303 was given precedence by the Office of
enacted by L 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-503, Legislative Research and General Counsel
*" «•«'•»"«»»« **\<\ tnHiis the present
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section (2); deleted Subsection (3), which contained provisions relating to notice, gave the
decision on enhanced penalties to the sentencing judge rather than the jury, and allowed the
court to suspend the imposition or execution of
the sentence; and made a related designation
change.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

2

I have denied that motion and I'll state the basis
for it.

3

Referring to Utah Code 76-3-508, which is the

4

5

statute governing this particular charge.

And when

6

interpreting a statute, one must try to read it internally

7

consistently and make it consistent, from one provision to

8

another.
Subsection (1) specifically states that a person

9
10

is guilty of this offense if the investigation is pending or

11

about to be instituted.

12

Subsection (2) , which is the

I provision the State has used to file this charge, does not

13

include that specific language.

But based on what I read to

14 I be the intent of this statute, I must also read Section 2 to
IS

be consistent with Section 1.

16

instituted" is consistent with what the statutory intent is.
Moreover, under Bradley

17 I

So I believe "about to be

and other cases, it is

18

clear that it is a subjective evaluation that we enter into

19

such when we consider such statutes.

And the subjective

20 I element being what the defendant reasonably believes to be
21

the case.

22

by the State to at least send that issue to the jury, based

23

on the information concerning defendant's conduct in this

24

case.

25

I believe there's sufficient evidence presented

And that is the basis for my denial of this

212
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1 motion.
Appreciate the good argument that both parties

2

3 have made.
4

It was a very interesting argument, indeed.
I will ask that you stay nearby or, if you leave,

5 make -- be available by cell phone and make that information
6 availabl.e to - to Lori so that we can move this on, get
7 back -- get you back as soon as possible once the jury
8 returns.
All right.

9

Thank you again for the good work.

10 We're in recess.
(Whereupon, court was in recess pending

11

the return of the jury.)

12
13

(Whereupon, at the hour of 1:19 p.m.,

14

the jury returned to the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

15

The record shall reflect the jury is

16 present and the defendant and both counsel are also present.
17

First, have you chosen a presiding officer?

18

MR. BELL: Yes.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BELL:

21

THE COURT:

And is that you, Mr. Bell?
Uh-huh.

(Affirmative.)

And has the jury reached a unanimous

22 verdict?>
23

MR. BELL:

24

THE COURT:

It has.
All right.

I111 ask you to give that

25 verdict to my bailiff. And before I look at it, I want to
213
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INSTRUCTION NO. I>
You are hereby instructed that the offense of Tampering with a Witness, as
charged in Count II of the Information, does not require ihe Slat. to prm o that an
"official proceeding or investigation" was underway, but only that defendant believed
that an "official proceeding 01* investigation" was underwayl
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I'liiie

,

questions

in thi s case

is the

;r *-he defendant as the person who committed the

identification
crime.
Many

f JI foib

.Jtfect

the

accuracy

of

identification.

In

considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is i/hi- person *hu » uinmit'teJ t.he crime, you
'ahouJd 'jonsider the following:
I,

Did the witness have adequate opportunity to observe the

criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a.

The length of time the witnesses obser' 'fid the actor;

b.

ietween the witness and the actor;
Jhe

extent

which

the

actor " s

features

were

visible and undisguised;
d.

ack of light at the place and time of

observation;
e.

The presence or (absence o!

distracting noises or

<iei i v 11 v" <iur inci trie 3bservation;
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INSTRUCTION NO. Ifp

Page Two

f.

Any

other

circumstances

affecting

the witness1

opportunity to observe the person committing the crime.
2.

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person

committing the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether the
witness' capacity was impaired by:
a.

Stress or fright at the time of observation;

b.

Personal motivations, biases or prejudices;

c.

Uncorrected visual defects;

d.

Fatigue or injury;

e.

Drugs or alcohol.

You should also consider whether the witness is of a different
race than the criminal actor.

Identification by a person of a

different race may be less reliable than identification by a person
of the same race,
3.

Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal

actor at the time of the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether the
witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time he
observed the actor.

Even if the witness had adequate opportunity
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Page Three

lL

and capacit

- -

• have done so

unless h* ^

- crime was being committed.
witness 1

4

identification

complete'

-

of

the

defendant

r

In answering this questions, you should consider:
The length of time that passed betweei \ the " witness

.11
; ,

.

s identification of the defendant;

b

I he witness' capacity arid state of mind at the time

of the identification;
The. witness 1 exposure to opinions, descriptions or
identification

given

by

other

newspaper account

witnesses,
>

-

to

photographs

or

influence that

may have affected the independence of his identification;
d

Any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness t-o

the crjme, f.aijlei1! I r identify

U'M» iJetend.int;
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Page Four

e.

/^

Any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to

the crime, gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent
with the defendant's appearance;
f.

The circumstances under which the defendant was

presented to the witness for identification.
You may take into account that an identification made by
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is
generally more reliable than an identification made from the
defendant being presented alone to the witness.

You may also take

into account that identifications made from seeing the person are
generally

more

reliable

than

identifications

made

from

a

photograph.
I

again

defendant

emphasize

that the burden

is the person who

prosecution.

committed

of proving
the

crime

that the
is on the

If, after considering the evidence you have heard

from the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the
eyewitness testimony in light of the consideration listed above,
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the
person who committed the crime, you must find him. not guilty.
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1 may, we're where we're at.
2

I just think that there was not enough evidence

3 given on that element that a jury could reasonably infer
4

that he believed that Mr. Maestas had called and was now a

5 witness in the technical sense of a witness.
6

And I'll submit it to the Court on that.

7

THE COURT:

8

I f m persuaded by the State's argument.

9

that it doesn't make sense to read a statute excluding the

All right.
I think

10 type of conduct that Mr. Yanez embarked upon, having chased
n

the victim and lost him and seeing him again within about a

12

15-, 20-minute period and then following him and shooting

13 him.

I defer to the jury on their decision, and certainly

14 believe that there was sufficient evidence for them to have
15 reached that conclusion.
16

Therefore, the motion is denied.

17

Let's speak about sentencing then.

You've

18 reviewed that presentence report now, Mr. Cramer?
19

MR. CRAMER:

We have, Your Honor, and we find

20 nothing in it that's -- that we would want to add to or
2i

correct.

I think it's fairly accurate and fairly thorough.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. NIELSEN:

24

The State's going to ask the Court to follow the

25

Mr. Nielsen, for the State.
Thanks, Your Honor.

recommendations of the presentence report and commit the
231
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\

Before you can find the defendant, Jaime Yanez, guilty of the offense of
Discharge of Firearm From a Vehicle, Near Highway, or in Direction of any Person,
Building, or Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the Information, you mustfindfromall of
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements:
1.

That on or about May 9, 2000;

2.

In Salt Lake County;

3.

The defendant;

4.

Did discharge a firearm;

5.

In the direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to
believe that any person may be endangered,
or
in the direction of any vehicle with the intent to intimidate or harass
another.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and everyone of the foregoing elements, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Discharge of Firearm From a Vehicle, Near Highway,
or in Direction of .my Person, Building, oi Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable dotibl \ A
any one or mor^

>regoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

16

Before you can find the defendant, Jaime Yanez, guilty of the offense of
Tampering with a Witness, as charged in Count II of the Information, you mustfindfrom
all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements:
1.

That on or about May 9, 2000;

2.

In Salt Lake County;

3.

The defendant;

4.

Did communicate to Robert Maestas a threat that a reasonable person
would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury;

5.

Because of any act performed or to be performed by Robert Maestas in his
capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or
investigation.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and everyone of the foregoing elements, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Tampering with a Witness, as charged in Count II of the
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
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1

pronounces his name as it's spelled, which is Jaime, I don't

2

want to be calling him by the wrong name.

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5 J I'll clarify that.
6 I

It's Jaime.

Jaime?

Okay.

All right.

Apologize for that and

Thank you.

Record should reflect that defense counsel had

7

come to the bench in a timely manner with a motion at the

8

end of the State's testimony in this case.

9

you a chance to argue.

10

MR. CRAMER:

Mr. Cramer, give

Your Honor, just briefly.

We would

n

just propose that - - w e would motion -- I would have

12

motioned at the proper time and did motion at the proper

13 J time
14 i

THE COURT:

You did so and the record reflects

15 I that it was timely.
16 I

MR. CRAMER:

Okay.

That we would request the

17

Court dismiss Count 2 on the grounds that the State hasn't

18

proven that Mr. Maestas was in the capacity of a witness or

19 I an informant in an official proceeding or investigation at
20

the time of the incident.

He testified that he was not an

21

informant for any law enforcement agencies, he had not

22

contacted any law enforcement agency at the time that this

23

incident happened and so was, therefore, not a witness in an

24

official proceeding and, therefore, we'd request that the

25

Court dismiss Count 2.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

2

Mr. Nielsen?

3

MR. NIELSEN:

Your Honor, I think the State has

4

offered some evidence, or at least sufficient evidence, to

5

allow this matter to go to the jury short of a directed

6

verdict on it.

7

of an investigation, it doesn't have to be one that's going

8

on at that time or thereafter but that there's the

9

likelihood that one will be instituted.

The caselaw is clear that, in the definition

And we can provide

10

the cases to Your Honor if you'd like.

n

this case, if Mr. Maestas, who said that he's observed

12

graffiti, contacted the police, certainly observed the

13

defendant walking around with a gun, makes him a witness to

14

some potential criminal act.

15

to the detective, was that they were following up on a

15

graffiti complaint.

17

from there.

18

But, obviously, in

And the likelihood,

according

An investigation would have pursued

I don't think the requirement is we have to show

19

there was in fact an active investigation pending at the

20

time or that it was imminent, but believe that there was the

21

possibility of an investigation and that Mr. Robert Maestas

22

would have been a witness in that

23

MR. CRAMER:

investigation.

Your Honor, one -- and I was already

24

going to argue this first, and if the Court wishes to grant

25

Counsel a rebuttal, I would not object.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CRAMER:

Uh-huh.
I would argue that, also, the grounds

3

that this witness tampering is merged with the other two

4

charges similar to the recent case -- and I don't have the

5

case cite with me and I didn't bring it with me -- where the

6

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court held that the

7 kidnapping and rape are not necessarily -- cannot be charged
8

in every rape, because every rape has an element of forced--

9

type of a forced -- what's the word I'm looking for --

10 restriction and restraining -11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CRAMER:

Right.

Right.

-- of the victim.

And, therefore, I

13 would argue that -- likewise, that every violent act that
14 may be charged against somebody would then also contain some
15 element of a witness tampering-type charge and that it's
16 merged because -17

THE COURT:

Well, that merger would go to the

18 discharge of the firearm charge.

But what Mr. Nielsen has

19 argued is that the investigation would be with regard to the
20 graffiti, the tagging, and it was with that.

I think your

21

argument's well taken and it was a Utah State Supreme Court

22

as a Justice Stewart decision quite recently.

But that's

23 not what Mr. Nielsen was arguing.
24
25

Isn't that what you're saying, that it would merge
with the discharge of a firearm?
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1

MR. CRAMER:

Yes.

That the -- that the witness

2

tampering would merge with the discharge of a firearm

3

charge.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. CRAMER:

6

THE COURT:

8

MR. CRAMER:

12

Right.

That's fine.

-- representation.

So if the Court

wanted to hear from Mr. Nielsen, I would certainly --

10
n

And, as I said, I didn't argue that

in my first --

7

9

Right.

THE COURT:

I'd like to hear from Mr. Nielsen on

that.
MR. NIELSEN:

We don't believe there's any merger

13

because there's no greater or lesser relationship where

14

these would merge.

15

tampering is the witness in observing the graffiti or the

16

defendant with the gun and not the actual offense of

17

discharging the weapon or being a restricted person or

18

anything of that nature.

19

THE COURT:

And we are arguing that witness

Well, I'm going to deny the motion

20

with regard to the merger argument based on what

I've

21

already stated.

22

advisement with regard to the -- the previous argument,

23

which was official proceeding or investigation, Mr. Nielsen.

24

I'm simply not familiar with that caselaw.

25

get that to me, and Mr. Cramer, if you could do that.

But I am going to take the issue under

And if you could
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